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Abstract This paper critically discusses D. Z. Phillips’ use of literary works as a resource 
for philosophical reflection on religion. Beginning by noting Phillips’ suggestion, made in 
relation to Waiting for Godot, that the possibilities of meaning that we see in a literary work 
can reveal something of our own religious sensibility, I then proceed to show what we learn 
about Phillips from his readings of certain works by Larkin, Tennyson, and Wharton. 
Through exploring alternative possible readings, I argue that, although Phillips’ discussions 
are of considerable philosophical interest, they undermine his claim to be deploying a 
purely contemplative hermeneutical method. 
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… [T]he words in our lives and the life in our words reveal where and who we are. 
—D. Z. Phillips1 
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 Phillips (2006, p. 88). My references to this work will be to the second edition. The first edition was 
published by Macmillan in 1991. 
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D. Z. Phillips was a pioneer in the areas of both philosophy of religion and philosophy of 
literature, and he frequently combined these interests in order to show how possible 
religious perspectives can be elucidated through philosophical engagement with literary 
works. In this paper, by reflecting critically upon Phillips’ use of particular literary 
examples in his philosophizing about religion, I highlight some important lessons that can 
be learnt from his work. 
The paper comprises three main sections. The first discusses remarks of Phillips’ upon 
Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot and upon a poem by Philip Larkin. I initially show 
how Phillips uses Beckett’s play to illustrate his claim that the possibilities of meaning seen 
by someone in a work of literature can reveal something about the reader’s religious 
understanding; then I show how Phillips’ own reading of Larkin’s Myxomatosis exhibits 
the strength with which Phillips himself holds a particular conviction, which is not 
obviously endorsed in the poem. The second section considers Phillips’ interpretation of 
certain stanzas from Tennyson’s In Memoriam. Here I argue that, despite his own 
professedly contemplative hermeneutical approach, Phillips has been too quick to construe 
Tennyson’s poem in crude metaphysical terms. The third section develops the suggestion 
that Phillips’ interpretive approach may be more advocatory than he overtly admits. With 
reference to his reading of Edith Wharton’s short novel Bunner Sisters, I bring out the 
extent to which Phillips is concerned to promote a particular conception of Christian self-
renunciation, which is influenced by the later writings of Simone Weil. 
The upshot of these reflections is twofold. Firstly, we should note that Phillips’ point, 
that the scope and limitations of one’s religious understanding can be disclosed through 
one’s readings of literary works, applies as much to Phillips himself as to anyone else; and 
hence, while there is much to learn from Phillips’ insights into certain works, we should be 
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alert to occasional biases in his readings. Secondly, these biases expose limitations in the 
extent to which he was able to carry through his promise of a purely contemplative, and 
hence non-polemical and non-apologetic, hermeneutics of religion. 
 
Revealing where and who we are 
In a discussion of Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, Phillips criticizes the view that the point of 
the play, along with much of Beckett’s other work, is to show that words—our everyday 
speech and language, and especially our religious forms of language—have no meaning. 
Phillips finds this view most prominently expressed in Martin Esslin’s well-known book 
The Theatre of the Absurd (1977). The view is false, argues Phillips, since the predicament 
of the two central characters in Waiting for Godot “is not that words have no meaning, but 
that their words have the meaning that they do.”2 Phillips’ point here is similar to one made 
by Stanley Cavell in an essay on Beckett’s Endgame. “The discovery of Endgame,” writes 
Cavell, “both in topic and technique, is not the failure of meaning (if that means the lack of 
meaning) but its total, even totalitarian, success—our inability not to mean what we are 
given to mean.”3 Part of what is being said here, by both Phillips and Cavell, is that the 
meanings of our words are not entirely under our control; we cannot simply decide what to 
mean by them, as Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty supposed he could.4 The meanings of 
our words are constituted by the uses to which they are put in particular contexts, and it is 
the congruence between what we do with words and what others do with them, within the 
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 Phillips (2006, p. 81). 
3
 Cavell (1976, p. 117). 
4
 See Carroll (1982 [1872], p. 184): “‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it 
means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’” 
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overall context of a shared form of life, that determines whether what we say is or is not 
meaningful.
5
 
What Phillips wants to stress is that the ways in which Beckett’s characters use words 
often appear strange or ridiculous precisely because they try to use them independently of 
the patterns of communicative life by which they are normally surrounded. As Phillips 
sees it, the expectation that words can retain their sense outside of their natural linguistic 
environments pervades the forlorn philosophical enterprise that goes by the name of 
‘metaphysics.’ In this respect, as in many others, Phillips wishes to follow Wittgenstein’s 
advice “to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use”;6 and he holds 
that one of the valuable services Beckett performs for us is to exemplify the confusions 
that arise when, in Wittgenstein’s memorable phrase, “language goes on holiday.”7 
An illustration of what happens to religious words in particular when they are, as 
Phillips puts it, “dislocated from their familiar contexts” is given in the brief exchange that 
Vladimir and Estragon have in Waiting for Godot concerning repentance.
8
 “Suppose we 
repented,” suggests Vladimir. “Repented what?” inquires Estragon, to which Vladimir 
replies, “Oh … We wouldn’t have to go into the details.”9 Phillips observes that “Vladimir 
has severed repentance from its religious surroundings”, disconnecting it from the feelings 
of sorrow and remorse that accompany genuine expressions of repentance—remorse about 
specific acts or omissions in our lives.
10
 On Phillips’ view, the incident does not show that 
the word ‘repentance’ has no meaning, or that the activity of repenting is meaningless; it 
                                                 
5
 The same observation has been made by Rowan Williams in his recent book on Dostoevsky: “It is in one 
sense true that we can say what we like; in another sense, manifestly not true, since we are performing 
linguistically within a world in which we have to make ourselves recognizable to other speakers, as they are 
to us’ (Williams 2008, p. 11). 
6
 Wittgenstein (2001 [1953], sect. 116). 
7
 Ibid., sect. 38. 
8
 Phillips writes of the dislocation of language in Phillips (1995). 
9
 Beckett (1986, p. 13). 
10
 Phillips (2006, p. 82). 
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shows that this word and this activity have their meaning by virtue of their associations 
with such things as remorse. It also, therefore, exposes the danger that ‘repentance’ will 
lose its meaning if the activities that constitute its meaning become merely mechanical 
and devoid of feeling. 
Phillips acknowledges that different people may hear different meanings, or different 
possibilities of meaning, within the same text. This is why he asserts that “the words in 
our lives and the life in our words reveal where and who we are.”11 His point is that 
certain features of our character, including ethical and religious features, will show up in 
the sense that we are able to make of forms of linguistic expression, both within works of 
literature and in life in general.
12
 In this way, literature can reveal important truths about 
ourselves. Phillips makes the point with reference to how different people may interpret 
the language of Vladimir and Estragon: 
 
Some will see the tramps as partly trapped by the language of childish illusions and as partly 
seeing through this language, but these readers will have no conception of anything else 
religious language could be. Others see the tramps as victims of what their language has 
become, a language of vulgar prudence. Among these readers, some may be able to contrast this 
with a deeper conception of religious faith. Others, including perhaps Beckett himself, will find 
in the vulgarised language echoes of something else it once was, without being able to make 
this ‘something else’ explicit. For others, and they are many, the tramps are lost souls who do 
not see what is in their interests; who do not see that it pays to worship God.
13
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 Ibid., p. 88. 
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 A similar thought is expressed by Peter Winch, though not with direct reference to our understanding of 
literature: “What a man finds it possible or impossible to say, the difficulty or ease with which he can 
combine diverse ideas, are important indications of the kind of man he is” (Winch 1987, p. 138).  
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 Phillips (2006, p. 88). 
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One way of describing the philosophical project that Phillips pursues through his 
engagement with literature is to say that it consists in a sustained attempt to make the 
‘something else’ explicit. Against the charges of religious revisionism or reductionism that 
are often pressed by his critics, Phillips conceives of himself as “not reforming anything, 
not going anywhere, but contemplating an old, old story and seeing what gets in the way of 
telling it today.”14 It is this ‘old, old story’ that Phillips takes to be the ‘something else’ that 
is frequently obscured or ignored in the accounts of religious belief purveyed by many 
contemporary theologians and philosophers of religion. The story in question is one that, 
unlike ‘vulgar’ or ‘shabby’ misconceptions of Christian faith, does not construe belief in 
God as involving an expectation that everything will turn out “all right in the end.”15 
Instead, it emphasizes that a recognition of the will of God involves accepting that, “in 
nature, and in our dealings with each other, rain falls on the just and the unjust … that 
nothing is ours by right, and that we are all dependent on grace.”16 
The acknowledgement of this conception of the Christian message is bound up, for 
Phillips, with a relinquishment of the impulse towards explanation that is found in much 
philosophy of religion, an impulse that manifests in various forms. One form that it takes is 
the search for explanations of why human beings hold religious beliefs at all. Some 
philosophers will argue that it is because the beliefs are true, or at least that there are good 
reasons for holding them to be true, whereas others will argue that there are certain facts 
about human beings, perhaps psychological or sociological facts, that make us prone to 
develop religious beliefs, even though such beliefs are not themselves true. Each of these 
philosophical tendencies, which are versions of religious realism and non-realism 
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 Phillips (1999, p. 165). 
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 Phillips (2006, p. 51). 
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respectively, involves the desire to explain the phenomenon of religious belief. Another 
form that the impulse towards explanation takes occurs specifically in the context of 
arguments concerning the theological problem of evil. Many theologians and philosophers 
of religion participate in the business of theodicy, which is the attempt to explain how the 
evil and suffering that is so evident in the world around us can be compatible with the 
existence of an all-loving and all-powerful God. 
Phillips rejects both of these explanatory enterprises. He maintains that theologians and 
philosophers go in search of a chimera when they try to find a general explanation of why 
human beings hold religious beliefs. Such putative explanations cannot achieve what they 
aspire to achieve because religious beliefs are not founded on anything more basic than 
themselves: the beliefs are partially constitutive of forms of life, and forms of life are, on a 
Wittgensteinian view, “[w]hat has to be accepted, the given”.17 The philosopher’s task, if 
anything, is to describe these forms of life in order that their workings may be better 
understood, but not to explain them.
18
 This is not to say that we cannot come to a deeper 
understanding of the place that religious beliefs have in particular people’s lives; but 
coming to a deeper understanding must, on Phillips view, be distinguished from explaining. 
With regard to explanations of the theodical type, Phillips sees these as being rooted in 
the sorts of ‘shabby’ conceptions of religion that I mentioned briefly above. On these 
conceptions, God is assigned the role of divine compensator, repaying those who have 
suffered pain or hardship in this life and doling out rewards and punishments in accordance 
with individuals’ moral or immoral behaviour. God, as Marilyn McCord Adams has 
recently put it, must be “capable of making good on the many and various horrors that 
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 Wittgenstein (2001 [1953], p. 192e). 
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 Cf. Wittgenstein, ibid., sect. 109: “We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take 
its place.” 
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human beings perpetrate every day on one another”; only by believing in such a God, she 
maintains, can an optimistic attitude to life be rationally justified.
19
 Phillips argues 
forcefully in several places that such a conception inevitably turns God into a monster, not 
least because it portrays him as deliberately allowing the most abhorrent of evils to occur, 
making a calculation that such evils will all turn out to have been worthwhile in the end.
20
 
There is much more that could be said about Phillips’ reasons for rejecting explanatory 
strategies in the philosophy of religion, but my purpose here is not to establish whether the 
rejection is sound. Rather, my purpose is the far more modest one of giving an example of 
where this rejection appears to guide Phillips’ appreciation of a particular literary work in 
such a way as to reveal, or emphasize, ‘where and who’ Phillips is. Since many readers are 
liable, upon reflection, to find Phillips’ interpretation of the work in question implausible, 
the example serves both to weaken the credibility of Phillips’ reading while at the same 
time adding support to his broader claim concerning how our interpretations of literary 
works expose something about ourselves. The work in question is Larkin’s poem 
Myxomatosis, and I will come to this shortly. First, however, it is worth saying something 
about the affinity that Phillips feels with the atheistic sensibility that comes through in 
Larkin’s poetry more generally. 
What Phillips identifies with in Larkin’s work is precisely the denial of any 
compensation beyond this life. Following Simone Weil, Phillips recognizes that the desire 
for compensation is deeply ingrained in the human mind. “Every time that we put forth 
some effort and the equivalent of this effort does not come back to us in the form of some 
visible fruit,” writes Weil, “we have a sense of false balance and emptiness which makes us 
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think that we have been cheated.”21 Phillips echoes this thought when he writes that “We 
feel that something must turn up, to rectify matters, to balance the books.”22 This feeling 
gives rise to what Phillips calls the ‘transcendental superstition’ that “someday, somehow, 
everything will be all right.”23 Here it might be suggested that Phillips is himself offering a 
psychological explanation of a certain kind of religious belief, albeit a kind of belief that he 
regards as shallow and naïve. But let us leave that consideration aside for now. The salient 
point to note is that Phillips sees in Larkin, and also in Wallace Stevens, a poet who flatly 
refuses to fall for the transcendental superstition, and thus someone who is, to that extent, 
an ally in the struggle against shabby dogmas of compensation. Phillips recognizes this 
aversion to superstition in Larkin’s poem Next Please, which ends by declaring that “Only 
one ship is seeking us, a black- | Sailed unfamiliar, towing at her back | A huge and birdless 
silence. In her wake | No waters breed or break.”24 As Phillips puts the point: “Death is the 
only boat that awaits us, but it has no compensating cargo.”25 
Beyond this rejection of any notion of post-mortem survival, Phillips also finds in 
Larkin a resistance to grandiose explanations of suffering, and it is in this connection that 
he cites Larkin’s poem Myxomatosis. The poem tells of an incident where the narrator 
encounters a rabbit caught in a trap. He imagines the rabbit asking “What trap is this? 
Where are its teeth concealed?” “I make a sharp reply”, the poem’s narrator continues, the 
implication being that he has swiftly killed the rabbit, 
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 Weil (1951, p. 150). This passage is quoted by Phillips in several places, including Phillips (1970, p. 52); 
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 Phillips (2006, p. 51). 
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 Larkin, quoted in Phillips (2006, p. 51). 
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 Phillips (2006, p. 51). 
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Then clean my stick. I’m glad I can’t explain 
Just in what jaws you were to suppurate: 
You may have thought things would come right again 
If you could only keep quite still and wait.
26
 
 
Picking up on the narrator’s gladness at being unable to explain, Phillips reads this as “the 
mark of Larkin’s honesty, not only about the plight of animals, but about the traps that lie 
in wait for human beings too. … Notice, he is glad that he cannot explain. To think there is 
an explanation, a remedy, is to indulge in a lie and a deception.”27 Phillips is almost 
certainly making too much of the poem’s point here; or rather, is obscuring the point that 
the poem is making. Crucially, in both the first and second editions of the book in which 
Phillips’ essay appears, Larkin’s poem is printed with its seventh line—“Just in what jaws 
you were to suppurate”—missing, an oversight which may have contributed to the 
waywardness of Phillips’ reading. Phillips takes Larkin to be exclaiming that he’s glad not 
to be able to devise pompous explanations to account for the suffering of animals or 
humans. But a more natural reading, especially in the light of the line that Phillips’ essay 
omits, would attribute the narrator’s gladness to the impossibility of his being called upon 
to explain to the rabbit why someone set a trap that would inevitably result in its slow and 
painful death. Among those who interpret the poem in this way is the theologian Robert 
Fisher, who notes that he can identify with Larkin’s sentiment: “It would be embarrassing 
to explain to an animal just exactly what human beings get up to. I’d be ashamed to explain 
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 Myxomatosis, in Larkin (1977, p. 31). 
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 Phillips (2006, pp. 54, 55). 
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to an animal that we have the ability to sit down and think about the construction and 
design of a trap.”28 
Of course, poems characteristically lend themselves to multiple interpretations, and 
Phillips’ reading of Myxomatosis may not be stretching the range of possible construals too 
far. Yet by quickly assuming it to be the most obvious interpretation, Phillips reveals 
something about himself. In allowing his own resistance to theodicies and other forms of 
over-inflated explanation to colour his receptivity to the poem, Phillips inadvertently 
demonstrates how cool contemplation of someone’s words can be thwarted by the 
momentum of a theoretical (or, in this case, anti-theoretical) agenda. Perhaps we also see 
evidence here for another of Phillips’ claims, that although “the words in our lives reveal 
who we are”, “[o]ne of the most difficult things is to see ourselves.”29  
 
In Memoriam and defective vision 
As we have seen already, one of the chief tasks that Phillips sets himself in his writings on 
literature is to disclose possibilities of religious meaning beyond the shallow or distorted 
accounts purveyed by many contemporary philosophers and theologians. These latter 
accounts are shallow, according to Phillips, in as much as they misconstrue religious belief 
as being motivated by the desire for compensation, and they are distorted in so far as they 
make unwarranted assumptions about the objects of religious beliefs; they typically assume, 
for example, ‘eternal life’ to mean temporal existence without end and ‘God’ to denote a 
kind of entity among other entities. If religious belief amounted to no more than what these 
assumptions suggest, then Phillips would prefer atheism. This is why he feels an affinity 
with the likes of Larkin and Wallace Stevens, for he takes himself to be rejecting the sort of 
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 Fisher (2003, p. 35). 
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 Phillips (2006, p. 89). 
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puerile religion that they too reject. Where he differs, of course, is in his insistence that 
religion—and Christianity in particular—need not be like that. 
In order to illustrate alternative poetic visions, one of the contrasts that Phillips sets up 
is between Stevens and Tennyson. He describes Stevens as “a poet of acceptance”, who 
perceives the ephemerality of life as among its natural qualities and not as something to be 
regretted or railed against. Tennyson, meanwhile, is a troubled soul who “sees life as 
incomplete, existence as a riddle.”30 In In Memoriam in particular Tennyson wavers 
between hopelessness and a version of religious belief hardly deserving of the name, unable 
to find the words to express the faith he yearns for. This reading of Tennyson’s great elegy 
on the death of his dear friend Arthur Hallam is, however, highly questionable. While the 
poem undoubtedly embodies the poet’s unsettled relationship with faith, this is arguably its 
greatest strength as opposed to a deficiency. And by attributing to Tennyson a paucity of 
spiritual imagination Phillips again reveals something about himself; in this instance, an 
inability to see more than insipid metaphysical speculations where evulsive emotional self-
exploration is present. I will elaborate this criticism below. 
Taking his cue from certain remarks in T. S. Eliot’s essay on In Memoriam,31 Phillips 
regards the poem’s articulations of despair and doubt as being superior to its allusions to 
immortality, the latter amounting to little more than attempts by the author “to convince 
himself … that his friend has survived death, and is now living in some other realm, in 
some heaven.”32 Among the stanzas selected by Phillips for harshest criticism is one in 
which Tennyson urges someone—presumably Hallam, or the spirit thereof—to “Descend, 
and touch and enter; hear | The wish too strong for words to name; | That in the blindness of 
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 Eliot (1951 [1936]). 
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 Phillips (2006, p. 25). 
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the frame | My Ghost may feel that thine is near.”33 Phillips says of these lines that they 
express Tennyson’s wish for his friend to somehow “get in touch with him” and that they 
“smack more of a séance than of spirituality”, adding that, from the standpoint of Wallace 
Stevens, “this is an attempt to turn Hallam into an ethereal being; into an angel, almost. We 
have lost sight of Hallam as he really was.”34 At some level Tennyson is indeed expressing 
a longing for contact, yet to suggest that his words should put us in mind of a séance is 
obtuse. In this verse, as in many others, Tennyson strives to capture something of the mood 
stirred by the loss of the friend he loved and still loves. Pace Phillips, we are not forced to 
read the term ‘Ghost’ here—or similar terms such as ‘Spirit’ and ‘Soul’ elsewhere in the 
poem—as implying a belief in the sorts of ‘ethereal beings’ with whom Spiritualist 
mediums claim to commune, just as, in other contexts, we are not forced to read, say, talk 
of the third person of the Trinity in that way. When Tennyson wishes that his ghost may 
feel the ghost of his friend, he is wishing that the connection with Hallam may remain in 
place, that death may not diminish the love between them. To feel the nearness of someone, 
of someone’s spirit, need not be construed in terms of spatial proximity, and we need not 
imagine the descent of Hallam’s ghost as resembling a diaphanous being descending from 
the sky. Yet even if an image of this kind is what Tennyson’s words evoke in one’s 
imagination, it does not follow that the image is somehow what the words mean—for the 
image itself may mean, or express, something that eludes translation into merely descriptive 
language. 
I am thinking here of Wittgenstein’s discussion of religious pictures in his Lectures on 
Religious Belief. By ‘pictures’, Wittgenstein means a broader category than mere visual 
representations; he includes expressions that might take either visual or verbal form. 
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 From Canto 42, quoted in Phillips (2006, p. 26). 
34
 Phillips (2006, p. 26). 
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Reminding us not to treat pictures expressive of religious beliefs too simplistically, he 
indicates the possibility of a middle course between trying to take them literally (in which 
case it becomes hard to see any sense in them) and taking them to be merely figurative 
ways of expressing some emotion or sentiment. Wittgenstein is reported to have asked his 
students during one of the lectures to “Suppose someone, before going to China, when he 
might never see me again, said to me: ‘We might see one another after death’—would I 
necessarily say that I don’t understand him? I might say [want to say] simply, ‘Yes. I 
understand him entirely.’” When Wittgenstein’s student Casimir Lewy proposes that “In 
this case, you might only mean that he expressed a certain attitude”, Wittgenstein replies: “I 
would say ‘No, it isn’t the same as saying “I’m very fond of you”’—and it may not be the 
same as saying anything else. It says what it says. Why should you be able to substitute 
anything else?”35 
A lesson that I take from these remarks of Wittgenstein’s for our present topic is that, 
when contemplating the meaning of Tennyson’s words in In Memoriam, we are not obliged 
to ascribe to Tennyson either a crude realism or a crude expressivism. We can resist 
ascribing to him the belief that he and Hallam will, or may, meet up after death much as 
two living people might meet up at the pub after work, and so too can we resist reducing 
Tennyson’s words to the expressions of attitudes that might, in principle, be just as well 
expressed in other, purely secular terms. Of course, it would hardly be satisfactory for us to 
simply shrug our shoulders and settle for the fact that Tennyson’s words say what they say. 
But, as Phillips well knows, Wittgenstein’s point is not that, in the case of religious 
expressions, you either understand them or you don’t and there’s nothing more to be said. 
Rather, when we consider Wittgenstein’s later approach to philosophy more generally, we 
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 Wittgenstein (1966, pp. 70–71).  
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see that his central point is that one cannot understand the meaning of an expression in 
isolation from the context, the form of life, in which it has its place. 
A remark complementary to this last suggestion is found in Eliot’s essay on In 
Memoriam, where he describes the poem as “the concentrated diary of a man confessing 
himself”, adding that “It is a diary of which we have to read every word.”36 The suggestion 
here is that our understanding of certain lines and stanzas will be shaped and nuanced by 
their contextualization within the poem as a whole. We do it a disservice when we pluck 
stanzas out of context and impute to them a coarse metaphysical or quasi-empirical sense, 
for this sense becomes far more subtle and emotionally textured when interwoven with the 
overall tapestry of the poem. We see the meanings of the words by virtue of their positions 
and roles within the whole, just as we see the meanings of words in general by virtue of the 
place that they have in our lives. And nor should we forget the vital contributions of rhythm 
and rhyme to the poem’s sense, its spirit of self-interrogation and religious exploration 
being poignantly evoked through its rhythmic “undulations to and fro” (Canto 62)—the a–
b–b–a rhyme scheme ensuring that, as Seamus Perry eloquently observes, “whatever the 
sense of purpose with which it sets out,” each verse “ends acoustically haunted by the 
thought with which it began.”37 
In a review of Phillips’ From Fantasy to Faith, Colin Lyas credits Phillips with having 
exposed In Memoriam’s “emotional and conceptual shortcomings” and “defective vision of 
heaven.”38 Yet it is difficult to see where these shortcomings lie or why Tennyson’s vision 
of heaven should be judged defective. Indeed, it is not clear to me what this latter 
judgement amounts to. While Tennyson certainly lacks confidence in the religious 
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vocabulary that he deploys, it is precisely this openly acknowledged lack that marks the 
sincerity of his religious ruminations. When someone deems a spanner or a light bulb to be 
defective, it is clear what is meant: the item in question does not work, fails to fulfil the 
function for which it was intended. But by what criteria are we to deem a vision of heaven 
defective? Presumably, such a vision is one that Phillips himself, and perhaps Lyas too, 
finds spiritually unappealing. Neither Phillips nor Lyas can be criticized for this. But we 
should notice here a tension between the readiness of Phillips and Lyas to pass judgement 
on Tennyson’s religious vision on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the non-evaluative 
standpoint that Phillips professes his own contemplative mode of hermeneutics to adopt. In 
a posthumously published essay, in which he is replying to various points raised by Stephen 
Mulhall, Phillips tries to distance his own contemplative approach to philosophy from what 
he sees as the engaged advocacy evinced by Stanley Cavell among others. At one point 
Phillips asks rhetorically, “But how can Cavell’s advocacy of specific values relating to 
ethics, religion and philosophy be rendered compatible with contemplation of the variety of 
values to be found in these contexts?”39 The suggestion is clearly that Phillips’ own 
approach eschews such advocacy. Yet in Phillips’ remarks on In Memoriam we see more 
than a mere “contemplation of the variety of values to be found in [the poem]”; on the 
contrary, we see sharp criticisms of a form that values can take. 
Thus there are at least two important lessons to be learnt from Phillips’ treatment of 
Tennyson’s poem. Firstly, we learn how easy it is to miss the depth and subtlety expressed 
by a literary work, especially when one construes imaginative depictions of emotional and 
spiritual feelings as primarily embodying speculations concerning the post-mortem survival 
of disembodied beings. Secondly, we learn something of the difficulty—perhaps 
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impossibility—of keeping contemplation and critical evaluation apart in the context of 
reflection upon a religious point of view. As in the case of Phillips’ reading of Larkin’s 
Myxomatosis, his remarks on In Memoriam reveal something of where and who he is; and 
hence again they support his contention that where and who we are becomes manifest in the 
possibilities of meaning that we can see in works of literature. 
 
Conceptions of self-sacrifice 
There is, then, a very thin line, and perhaps at certain places no discernable line at all, 
between bringing to light what one considers to be an overlooked conception of religious 
faith on the one hand, and positively advocating that conception on the other. We have seen 
the critical aspect of this endeavour illustrated in Phillips’ and Lyas’s characterization of 
Tennyson’s vision of heaven as in some way ‘defective’; and I now turn to an instance in 
which Phillips draws upon a work of literature to elucidate what he sees as a more edifying 
conception of faith, the work in question being a short novel by Edith Wharton entitled 
Bunner Sisters. Phillips takes issue with readings of this story according to which its 
principal objective is, as Marilyn French puts it, to strip “the ‘virtue’ of self-sacrifice” of 
“whatever moral exaltation, nobility, or grandeur it possesses”,40 the implication of such 
interpretations being that Wharton had seen through to the fact that the self-sacrificing 
attitude of nineteenth-century women was more a product of misogynistic social 
conditioning than a genuine manifestation of virtue. Against those who take this view of the 
self-sacrificing behaviour of the novella’s central character, Ann Eliza Bunner, Phillips 
maintains that her behaviour does in fact derive from a sincere and valuable religious 
attitude, albeit one that is ultimately crushed in Ann Eliza herself. While acknowledging 
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 French (1984, p. xiv). 
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this character’s eventual loss of faith, Phillips emphasizes that it is due only to the initial 
depth of that faith that “the story of its demise [has such] arresting power.”41 
Again Simone Weil needs to be mentioned here, for it is the conception of Christian 
virtue that Phillips finds most eloquently expressed in her writings that chiefly informs his 
reading of Wharton’s novella. On the basis of Weil’s notes, Phillips formulates a threefold 
analysis of the levels of expectation that must be overcome if a pure spirit of self-
renunciation is to be cultivated. The first, and grossest, level is that which is characteristic 
of the compensatory form of faith against which we have already witnessed Phillips raising 
objections; it is the expectation that, if one’s good deeds are not rewarded and one’s 
hardships compensated for in this life, then they must surely be in some future life. From 
the standpoint that Phillips wishes to articulate, such expectations are delusory attempts to 
evade the fact that rain falls indiscriminately on the just and the unjust.
42
 The second level 
of expectation to be renounced is that according to which one’s own beneficent acts are 
expected to issue, if not in actual rewards, then at least in expressions of gratitude, and 
wrongdoings committed against oneself are expected to be followed by apologies. While 
admitting the difficulty of relinquishing expectations of these ordinary moral courtesies, 
Phillips follows Weil in maintaining that “a pure love of the eternal” does indeed require 
such relinquishment.
43
 The third level is that of expecting neither some reward for oneself 
nor any pronouncement of gratitude from others, but merely expecting that one’s acts of 
love or kindness should at least be effective, that they should at least benefit those for whom 
they are intended. It is the surrendering of even this basic and ostensibly altruistic impulse 
that Phillips regards as placing the severest demand upon the Christian; for if one’s 
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 Cf. the Gospel of Matthew 5:45. 
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 See Phillips (2004, p. 196). 
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benevolence fails to reach its target, or results in some unintended ill-consequence for the 
recipient, the Christian cannot simply brush it off by saying “Well, I played my part. I 
sacrificed”— 
 
… for if indeed he loves the neighbour, his concern will not be focused on his own endeavours, 
but on the effects they have had on his neighbour. If misery and wretchedness ensue, he may 
feel that the sacrifice is mocked by the outcome.
44
 
 
It is the challenge that such circumstances pose for a Christian’s faith that, on Phillips’ 
reading, is perceptively explored in Bunner Sisters. 
The object of Ann Eliza’s self-denying actions is her younger sister Evelina. Ann Eliza 
gladly foregoes material comforts in order to purchase a gift for her sister’s birthday, and 
turns down a proposal of marriage in part because she knows that her sister is also attracted 
to the same man. This results in the man, Hermann Ramy, redirecting his marital ambitions 
towards Evelina; and when he marries her, they move away from New York, leaving Ann 
Eliza poor and lonely. Yet still she places her sister’s well-being above her own; and thus, 
when the sister’s marriage breaks up, Ann Eliza again looks after her younger sibling 
despite occasional outbursts of cruel ingratitude on Evelina’s part. It is when Ann Eliza 
learns from Evelina the extent of the misfortune that ensued from the brief and ill-fated 
marriage that Ann Eliza faces “the awful problem of the inutility of self-sacrifice.”45 The 
story’s narrator describes this demoralizing revelation in the following terms: 
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 Wharton (1984 [1916], p. 303). 
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Self-effacement for the good of others had always seemed to her both natural and necessary; but 
then she had taken it for granted that it implied the securing of that good. Now she perceived 
that to refuse the gifts of life does not ensure their transmission to those for whom they have 
been surrendered; and her familiar heaven was unpeopled. She felt she could no longer trust in 
the goodness of God, and that if he was not good he was not God, and there was only a black 
abyss above the roof of Bunner Sisters.
46
 
 
The story ends with Evelina having died and Ann Eliza venturing out to seek employment 
beyond the confines of the small shop that has been her home and business throughout her 
adult life. There is an air of new possibilities, but her religious faith is consigned to the 
past. 
While acknowledging that Ann Eliza’s loss of faith betrays a weakness in her 
conception of God, Phillips does not judge her to have believed in a God of compensation. 
Although she had indeed expected that God would guarantee “that the fruits of self-
sacrifice” be transmitted “to their intended beneficiary”,47 Ann Eliza had not expected any 
reward for herself or compensation for her own sufferings. Yet Phillips perceives her to 
have missed an alternative form that Christian faith may take, which gives full weight to the 
identification of God with love. Since “love always involves the possibility of its 
rejection”,48 a God who is love cannot legitimately be blamed when such rejection occurs. 
This emphasis on love is central to the ‘old, old story’ of Christianity that Phillips thinks 
has been so disastrously neglected in recent times, especially by philosophers of religion. It 
is this conception of God, according to which “the only omnipotence God has is the 
                                                 
46
 Ibid. (The phrase “the roof of Bunner Sisters” alludes to the roof of the shop, called ‘Bunner Sisters’, 
owned by the sisters. But of course the darkness has been cast over the lives of the sisters themselves.) 
47
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omnipotence of love”,49 that Phillips holds to be capable of reorienting the believer away 
from fallacious speculations about a calculating God who permits atrocities in order to 
achieve some supposedly greater good.
50
 
Whether Ann Eliza’s erstwhile faith was really as deep and genuine as Phillips surmises 
is, however, open to question. The motivations behind her ostensibly self-effacing 
behaviour are, to say the least, mixed. While a desire for her sister’s happiness is 
undoubtedly among those motivations, it is contaminated by a “passionate motherliness” 
which borders on obsession.
51
 She lives vicariously through Evelina, lacking any internal 
source of well-being or sense of pleasure in life. Her attachment is such that, when Evelina 
moves away, Ann Eliza is engulfed by her own loneliness: “Every one of her thoughts had 
hitherto turned to Evelina and shaped itself in homely easy words; of the mighty speech of 
silence she knew not the earliest syllable.”52 Her sister’s absence hits her like an 
overwhelming grief, exposing the neediness and insecurity out of which her self-denial had 
grown. This clinging emotional dependency can hardly exemplify the spirit of self-sacrifice 
that Phillips finds in authors such as Weil; or, if it did exemplify that spirit, it would reveal 
in it something disturbing and unattractive. 
In this context it is worth mentioning that Weil’s own conception of self-sacrifice has 
been criticized by certain interpreters of Christian morality, who argue that Weil moves so 
far in the direction of self-abnegation that she fails to do justice to the commandment to 
love one’s neighbour as oneself. Recent proponents of this criticism include Ruth 
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Groenhout and John Lippitt, each of whom cites the following passage from Weil’s Gravity 
and Grace as especially troubling:  
 
I cannot conceive of the necessity for God to love me, when I feel so clearly that even with 
human beings affection for me can only be a mistake. But I can easily imagine that he loves that 
perspective of creation which can only be seen from the point where I am … I must withdraw 
so that he can see it. I must withdraw so that God may make contact with the beings whom 
chance places in my path and whom he loves. … It is as though I were placed between two 
lovers or two friends. I am not the maiden who awaits her betrothed, but the unwelcome third 
who is with two betrothed lovers and ought to go away so that they can really be together.
53
 
 
“We are confronted here”, writes Groenhout, “with a woman who understands herself as 
deeply unlovable. The only thing she has to offer is to disappear, to go away, and thus to 
leave the Creator alone with the Creation.”54 Lippitt endorses this assessment, and adds 
that, in “present[ing] herself as intrinsically unlovable”, Weil “fails to pay attention to the 
‘as yourself’ of the second love commandment. The view of herself as merely an obstacle 
to God’s being able to be alone with his creation fails to recognize herself as a unique part 
of that creation.”55 Whether this reading is fair to Weil’s overall conception of self-
renunciation is doubtful. What Groenhout and Lippitt seem to miss is Weil’s emphasis, in 
passages very close in spirit to this one, not on complete disappearance but on an emptying 
out of personal desires and ambitions, thereby facilitating the channelling of pure love—the 
love of Christ—through the vessel of the finite human being.56 Rather than the destruction 
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 23 
of her body and soul, Weil seeks their ‘appropriation’ by God;57 and this aspiration for 
surrendering one’s whole self to God or Christ is by no means something peculiar to Weil 
within Christian traditions.
58
 
But my purpose here is not to get embroiled in exegesis of Simone Weil; it is to 
highlight a way in which a certain form of putatively Christian self-sacrifice can be 
criticized from a perspective that is itself Christian. Groenhout and Lippitt do not wish to 
downplay the importance of self-sacrifice in Christianity. Rather, they want to draw our 
attention to the need for a balance in the life of a Christian between serving others and 
acknowledging one’s own intrinsic worth. Regardless of whether their criticisms are well-
targeted at Weil, they do seem to have some force against the sort of sacrificial attitude 
exhibited by Ann Eliza Bunner. While the image of being an unwelcome third party who 
comes between God and his creation is used figuratively by Weil, in the case of the Bunner 
sisters this image takes on a more literal sense. Ann Eliza sees herself as an obstacle 
between Evelina and Hermann Ramy, and wishes to withdraw so that they can be together. 
Yet by withdrawing she does not become a pure vessel through which the love of Christ 
may operate in the world; she retains her cloying neediness, and hence finds herself 
emotionally torn: desiring her sister’s happiness, and yet, at the same time, desiring that her 
sister remain with her in order that it be she, Ann Eliza, who slavishly furnishes that 
happiness. The point that Groenhout and Lippitt are making is, in part, that one’s love and 
respect for others cannot be genuine in the absence of due love and respect for oneself: love 
for self and neighbour must, for the Christian, go hand in hand. It is hard to see anything 
but a travesty of that equilibrium in Ann Eliza’s attachment to Evelina. 
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To be fair to Phillips, it should be noted that he partially anticipates the sorts of points 
that I am making about the character of Ann Eliza Bunner. “No doubt,” he writes, “strong 
arguments can be advanced to show that Ann Eliza spoiled Evelina; that her early sacrifices 
did more harm than good; that Ann Eliza had a perfect right to a life of her own and lacked 
proper self-respect.”—“Yet,” he adds, “given these limitations, within them, surely, a rare 
self-sacrificial love is found, a love of such a kind that one reader, at least, would feel he 
had no right to judge Ann Eliza—no right at all.”59 Here Phillips is clearly speaking for 
himself: he sees in Ann Eliza something deeply admirable despite the limitations of her 
self-sacrificial attitude and faith in the love of God. In effect, Phillips is acknowledging that 
what he finds to be religiously valuable is disclosed through his interpretation of the story. 
While Phillips is right to stress that Wharton’s novella does not constitute an attack on 
self-sacrifice tout court, his assessment that the story’s “arresting power” derives from the 
“depth and genuineness of the faith” that is eventually lost by its central character strikes 
me as dubious. Phillips’ reading has, it appears, been skewed by a desire to project the self-
effacing spirit articulated in Simone Weil’s writings onto the character of Ann Eliza. A 
more contemplative assessment—that is, an assessment that is less emphatically spurred by 
the urge to promote a particular conception of Christian ethics—would note that the 
problem with Ann Eliza’s sacrifices is not just that they have tended to spoil Evelina; it is 
that they are based on emotional attachment as opposed to spiritual strength. It seems 
plausible to say that Ann Eliza’s loss of faith reveals not its former depth, but the shallow 
and confused nature of its foundations. 
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Conclusion 
My purpose in this paper has not been simply to raise objections to Phillips’ readings of 
particular works of literature. Rather, by engaging critically with those readings, I have 
sought to bring out some important lessons that Phillips’ work has to teach us about the use 
of literature as a source for philosophizing on religious meaning. Phillips openly admits the 
personal dimension of literary interpretation: he asserts that the range of possible meanings 
that we find in a work of literature reveals something about ‘where and who we are.’ We 
need not take Phillips to mean by this that literary interpretation is a purely subjective 
matter or that anyone’s interpretation is as good as any other; far from it. The possibility of 
alternative construals does not entail the abandonment of interpretive constraints, although 
it may well imply that those constraints cannot be assumed to be permanently fixed. 
One of the most interesting lessons to be learnt from Phillips’ work in this area derives 
from the tension between his avowedly ‘contemplative’ approach to philosophy of religion 
on the one hand, and the evident sympathy that he retains for a particular form of Christian 
spirituality on the other. Despite repeated reassurances that he is merely bringing out 
possibilities of sense that have tended to be obscured by prevalent prejudices and 
presuppositions, there is no disguising the preference that Phillips has for the kind of 
spirituality voiced by Simone Weil, and also by Søren Kierkegaard and others, over that 
which he sees articulated in most contemporary philosophy of religion. And this preference 
is not a purely philosophical one, as though he considered Weil and Kierkegaard to have 
been more successful than others at describing the grammar of Christian discourse; it is, 
over and above this, a religious preference, which manifests in moments of passionate 
polemic amidst the rhetoric of contemplation. 
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Sometimes Phillips’ own philosophical and religious predilections interfere with his 
contemplation of a literary work. We see this in differing ways in his readings of Larkin’s 
Myxomatosis, Tennyson’s In Memoriam, and Wharton’s Bunner Sisters. Phillips’ eagerness 
to find in Larkin an ally who rejects grandiose explanations for the suffering of all sentient 
beings causes him to miss the more down-to-earth point made by the narrator of 
Myxomatosis, that he is glad not to have to explain to the ensnared rabbit why such a nasty 
trap had been set. In the case of In Memoriam, Phillips’ aversion to conceptions of 
immortality that construe it in temporal and compensatory terms numbs him to the 
emotional depth embodied in both the haunting words and sombre rhythms of Tennyson’s 
poem. And in his reading of Bunner Sisters we see Phillips’ desire to find in the faith of a 
character a sincerity that echoes that of Simone Weil, whose own spirituality provides a 
paradigmatic refrain which reverberates throughout Phillips’ writings on religion; we thus 
also see a tendency to quickly gloss over features which place that faith’s sincerity in 
question. 
These thoughts concerning Phillips’ reflections on literature bring to light the difficulty 
of remaining true to a hermeneutics of contemplation in the philosophy of religion. They 
might even suggest that such a hermeneutics is more an ideal by which to be guided than a 
practically achievable philosophical method. Above all, they remind us of the difficulty, 
and importance, of bringing to our studies and enjoyment of literary texts an ongoing 
inquiry into the human subject who is reading those texts (namely, ourselves). With these 
considerations in mind, there is much for the philosopher of religion to gain from the 
contemplation of literature, and from the contemplations of D. Z. Phillips thereon.
60
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